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SYMPOSIUM 
UNDERSTANDING THE DEFEND TRADE 
SECRETS ACT (DTSA): 
THE FEDERALIZATION OF TRADE SECRECY1 
David Green 
James Pooley 
Elizabeth Rowe 
Ryan Calo, moderator 
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review is pleased to inaugurate our 
“symposium discussion” series in which leading experts are invited to 
engage in an evening symposium on a new or emerging area of law. 
The subject of our first evening symposium was the Defend Trade 
Secrets Act (DTSA), a federal statute signed into law on May 11, 
20162 that creates a federal civil cause of action for trade-secret 
misappropriation. The DTSA marks a significant federalization of 
trade secrecy law, giving companies the opportunity to protect against 
and remedy misappropriation of propriety information in federal 
court. 
Prior to the DTSA’s enactment, companies were essentially 
forced to bring trade secrecy claims in state court unless there was 
diversity jurisdiction; such diversity jurisdiction is rare in trade secret 
cases because, as one of our panelists, Mr. James Pooley notes, trade 
secret cases tend to have local actors. Because trade secrecy protection 
was a matter of state law, there has been a lack of uniformity in 
substantive trade secrecy standards, statutes of limitations, and 
 
 1. Please cite as Symposium, Understanding the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA): 
The Federalization of Trade Secrecy, 50 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 331 (2017). 
 2. Defend Trade Secrets Act, Pub. L. 114-153, § 3(a)(1), May 11, 2016, 130 Stat. 382 
(codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1832, et. seq.). 
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remedies. The DTSA now provides companies the option of filing suit 
in federal court through a uniform federal statute. 
But as with most new law, there are many unsettled issues, 
disagreements about the likely impact of the law, and much to be 
developed as the law is tested in court. To shed some light on the 
DTSA and the increasing importance of trade secrecy protection, the 
symposium panelists were: 
 DAVE H. GREEN – Mr. Green is currently Assistant 
General Counsel in Microsoft Corporation’s Intellectual 
Property Policy Group, counseling in the areas of 
copyright, trade secret and intermediary liability. He was 
previously Assistant General Counsel for Corbis Corp. 
and, prior to that, Assistant Attorney General to the 
University of Washington, advising on complex IP and 
licensing, privacy, and business matters. Mr. Green is a 
co-founder of several private companies which produce 
entertainment projects, including McQueen Racing (in 
partnership with the family of actor Steve McQueen) and 
Zero Point Ventures (in partnership with the Albert 
Einstein estate). 
 JAMES POOLEY – James Pooley has practiced intellectual 
property and technology law in Silicon Valley since 1973, 
with the exception of the period from 2009 to 2014 when 
he served as Deputy Director-General of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in Geneva. 
Mr. Pooley is the author of the law treatise TRADE 
SECRETS (1997, 2017) and the book SECRETS: MANAGING 
INFORMATION ASSETS IN THE AGE OF CYBERESPIONAGE 
(2015). He testified before the U.S. Senate Judiciary 
Committee in 2015 on the proposed, and now enacted, 
DTSA. 
 ELIZABETH A. ROWE – Elizabeth Rowe is the Feldman 
Gale Term Professor in Intellectual Property Law at the 
University of Florida College of Law, where much of her 
research addresses the intersection of trade secrets with 
employment law and/or technology. Professor Rowe is 
co-author of the first casebook in the United States 
devoted to trade secret law, ROWE & SANDEEN, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON TRADE SECRET LAW (2nd Edition, 
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2016) as well as the first “nutshell” treatise on the subject. 
Prior to joining academia, Professor Rowe was a partner 
at Hale and Dorr LLP (now WilmerHale) in Boston. 
And our moderator, 
 RYAN CALO – Professor Calo teaches at the University of 
Washington School of Law, where he is also a faculty co-
director of the school’s Tech Policy Lab, a unique 
interdisciplinary research unit. Professor Calo’s recent 
scholarship has appeared in the California, Columbia, 
George Washington, and Notre Dame Law Reviews. A 
founder of the annual “We, Robot” conference that 
explores social, legal, and policy issues related to robotics, 
Professor Calo has been named one of the most influential 
people in the field of robotics by Business Insider. 
 
RYAN CALO (MODERATOR): First we are going to hear from 
Jim. Jim, as Justin said, is intimately involved in this. I know you 
testified before the Senate just months before this law was 
promulgated and we would love for you to set us up and give us a 
sense of what this law does. 
JAMES POOLEY: Ok. Thank you. I have a few slides a little later 
on when we dive into several of the detailed provisions that I think are 
most important, but for right now what I want to do is set the stage. 
We need to look back a little bit in order to know where we have come 
from and how the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) compares to what 
we had before. As most of you appreciate, the law on trade secrets in 
the U.S. was created by the courts.3 It’s part of our common law. That 
was true here and in Britain. Up until 1939, we really just had a 
collection of trade secrecy cases. In 1939 we got the first Restatement 
of Torts4 and it included trade secrets as part of the provision on 
torts—part of the section that dealt with torts.5 No one was very clear 
about where trade secrecy really fit, but that’s where they put it at the 
time. When it came time to address the law in the Second Restatement 
 
 3. See Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523 (1837) (acknowledging the first known common law 
cause of action for the modern concept of trade secret law in the United States). 
 4. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (AM. LAW INST. 1934). 
 5. Id. 
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of Torts,6 they couldn’t come to a decision, and so it wasn’t covered 
in the second Restatement. Eventually it was in the third.7 
But in the meantime, because people were concerned that the law 
wasn’t moving forward and it needed a different approach than had 
existed in the 1939 Restatement, there was a push to create a uniform 
state law. So the commissioners on uniform state laws got a bunch of 
experts together and in 1979 they put out the first version of the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act.8 There was a second version in 1985,9 
which portended some changes that we would see coming later in the 
DTSA. But that was the state of play in the late 1970s. 
I started practicing in the early 1970s and started doing trade 
secret cases because that’s what there was to do in Silicon Valley as it 
was growing. The cases were local. And the issues were laid out on 
paper. In fact, it was through paper that you got access to information 
and you usually carried that information away by using the company’s 
photocopier at night when you weren’t supposed to be there, 
generating hundreds of copies and putting them in a box and going 
down the street to a new start-up. That was the typical way in which 
these cases played out. 
Keep in mind that again, this practice was all state law-based. 
There wasn’t so much a push for a federal law as there was a concern 
that following the end of the Cold War a bunch of government spies, 
particularly in Eastern Europe, had just been released into the system 
and were available for industrial espionage. And so there was a 
discussion about creating a law that would address this at the federal 
level and in the context of the criminal system. And that’s what led us 
to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996.10 That was the first federal 
law on trade secrets, regulating the behavior of people outside the 
government (there had been section 1905 of the Trade Secrets Act,11 
which basically made it a crime for any federal employee to release 
something that shouldn’t be released).12 That statute has existed for 
 
 6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
 8. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
1979) (amended 1985). 
 9. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
1985). 
 10. Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2012). 
 11. Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2012). 
 12. Id. 
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the last 20 years. Now, there was a discussion at the time that perhaps 
there should be a civil cause of action added into that legislation, but 
it was all done very, very quickly in the summer of 1996. There wasn’t 
enough time for the idea of a civil cause of action to be thoroughly 
vetted and discussed, so it went forward just as a criminal statute. 
What’s happened since then? Everything that used to be on paper 
is now digital and everything that used to be local—or many things 
that used to be local—are now cross-border. So over the last 20 years 
one of the things that we’ve seen, certainly industry has seen, is the 
increasing insecurity in the integrity of information that drives 
business. That insecurity is played out in fears about information being 
transmitted through networks on the Internet or in very small 
electronic devices that make that transportation of data very, very 
easy. And the actors that are involved in these kinds of activities come 
not just from down the street; they are often from other states and other 
countries. So, over time, the concern about the threat environment for 
information grew just as the value of information itself was growing. 
Owners of that information decided that the laws that we had and the 
procedures that we had to protect that information against theft and to 
pursue claims of misappropriation were basically inadequate. Why? 
In part because the state interpretation of the Uniform Act, by 
anybody’s measure who actually went in and started reading and 
comparing state statutes, was not really very uniform.13 At a certain 
level it was. There were concepts that were all the same. And most 
states got most of it the same as they enacted it, but it doesn’t enjoy 
anything close to the uniformity of the Uniform Commercial Code.14 
And so, there were different rules. Substantive rules. Then you layer 
on top of that different procedural rules. If you had actors in one of 
 
 13. See Andrew Campbell, The Federal Defend Trade Secrets Act, TENN. BAR ASS’N, (June 
1, 2017, 12:00 AM), http://www.tba.org/journal/the-federal-defend-trade-secrets-act (“Since its 
publication in 1979 and its amendment in 1985, primary protections have been found in the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) as adopted by 48 states (all but New York and Massachusetts). 
But even among those 48 states, variations and nuances in the UTSA are common.”) (footnote 
omitted); cf. Charles Tait Graves & Elizabeth Tippett, UTSA Preemption and the Public Domain: 
How Courts Have Overlooked Patent Preemption of State Law Claims Alleging Employee 
Wrongdoing, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 59, 65 (2012) (“Notwithstanding its title, the UTSA has not 
resulted in uniform rulings when it comes to deciding whether the state UTSA preempts common 
law claims arising from the same conduct.”) (footnote omitted). 
 14. See Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information Economy, 59 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1633, 1649–50 (1998) (“[U]nlike the Uniform Commercial Code, the UTSA never won the 
support of all of the states, and even the states that did adopt the UTSA modified it, sometimes 
substantially, before enactment.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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these misappropriation dramas living in other states, in order to get 
discovery (and that’s very important in trade secret cases), you had to 
get letters rogatory issued from one court to another state and it took 
weeks sometimes to get the kind of information that you needed. And 
sometimes the level of inquiry that you were allowed would differ 
from one jurisdiction to the next. All this was a problem. You have an 
issue that has a nationwide, and often now, international scope, and 
state courts that were not really well suited to handle these kinds of 
cases. At least those that had that kind of characteristic. 
Why not the EEA? The Economic Espionage Act was no panacea 
because it is a criminal statute.15 On average, only seven to eight cases 
were filed per year over its 20-year history. Trying to get the 
government actually interested in taking on these cases was always a 
little bit difficult. I had that happen in my own experience—calling on 
somebody who was part of the high-tech crime unit for the Department 
of Justice, describing to them a case that seemed to me to be very 
compelling and the response being, “Well, have you looked at your 
civil options.” So, even in cases where you wanted the government to 
get involved, you had to deal with their decision to take it on or not. 
And these cases are complicated. They’re difficult to win. So 
sometimes they just wouldn’t do it. And when they did, you had to 
give up control in order for your case to be handled. 
So industry came to the conclusion there was, there is a simple 
answer to all of this: add a civil cause of action to the existing structure 
and framework of the Economic Espionage Act.16 That’s where the 
DTSA came in. It was introduced after some tries that didn’t work. In 
the 114th Congress, in the summer of 2015, identical bills were 
introduced into the Senate and House adding a civil claim to EEA,17 
and, basically taking the position that there should be a choice. This 
shouldn’t be a replacement. So, Congress is not really willing to 
address whether or not it made the most sense to preempt state law. 
Just proposed an addition to state law by making it an option for a 
trade secret owner, who has a claim, that might affect inter-state 
commerce in some way, to be able to bring it to federal court without 
 
 15. Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2012). 
 16. See Robert B. Milligan, U.S. Senate Passes Bill Creating a Civil Cause of Action in 
Federal Court for Trade Secret Misappropriation, TRADING SECRETS, (April 5, 2016), 
http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2016/04/articles/dtsa/new-year-new-progress-2016-update-on-
defend-trade-secrets-act-eu-directive/. 
 17. H.R. 3326, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 1890, 114th Cong. (2015). 
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having to rely on diversity jurisdiction. And when you think about it, 
that’s a fairly difficult limitation in trade secret cases because you so 
often have local actors involved in this, making it very difficult to 
create diversity. At least full diversity. So, we have this, additional 
cause of action there, there was some controversy around it. 
Most of what was objected to in the statute had to do with ex parte 
seizure provisions that were written into the new law,18 borrowed from 
the Lanham Act, where we had, for some time, and had some 
experience with the use of ex parte seizure as a way to grab onto 
counterfeit goods. It wasn’t a really good fit for something as inchoate 
as trade secret rights, but there it was, and they wanted to do it, and 
they wanted to do it for a particular reason. And that is that companies 
wanted to have the ability, in a case where they knew ahead of time 
that something was either going to be taken out of jurisdiction, out of 
the country perhaps, or destroyed. To be able to go to court and get an 
order where the marshals could come in and seize the container for the 
information, or whatever it was, the disc drive, or what have you. And 
that had been a prospect in more than one case, not many, but enough 
so that it was deemed an important additional tool to have. Well, we 
spent most of our time debating whether that was an appropriate thing 
to have and whether or not the statute had enough protections built 
into it to prevent misuse of any type of ex parte seizure. At the end of 
the day, meaning where we are now, many months later, I, I think we 
can see that the provision, although its been requested a few times, it 
has not been invoked except in two cases,19 one of which remains 
entirely under seal.20 So, in the real world it has not had as much of an 
impact as we thought. At least not at this stage. 
There are three other provisions of the statute that I wanted to 
cover here. One of these three issues I want to talk to you about is the 
whistleblower protection issue. This came up long after the statute was 
introduced into Congress. And actually after I had testified and while 
 
 18. See Eric Goldman, Ex Parte Seizures and the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 72 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 284, 286 (2015). 
 19. Paul M. Mersino, The DTSA’s Ex Parte Seizure Order: The “Ex” Stands for 
“Extraordinary” (Guest Blog Post), TECH. & MKTG. LAW BLOG, (Feb. 1, 2017), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/02/the-dtsas-ex-parte-seizure-order-the-ex-stands-for-
extraordinary-guest-blog-post.htm (“The first was issued by the Southern District of New York 
in Mission Capital Advisors, LLC v. Romaka, No. 1:16-cv-05878-LLS (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016).”). 
 20. Id. (“It has also come to the author’s attention that an application for ex parte seizure was 
granted by a federal court in Florida in October 2016. To date, unfortunately, all information has 
been held under seal and is not yet public.”). 
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they were considering amendments. An article that had been written 
by Professor Peter Menell from Berkeley, on the sad state of protection 
for whistleblowers that exists under current trade secret law,21 
influenced the senators who were working on this statute to draft a 
provision that would address the problem of the employee who works 
at a place under confidentiality restrictions but finds evidence that a 
crime might be, be committed, or some other wrongdoing happening, 
and wants to be able to report it to law enforcement.22 You may be 
surprised to learn that there never has been any very specific protection 
in trade secret law that would cover that kind of behavior and exempt 
it. A few courts had talked about it as a public interest kind of thing,23 
but it hadn’t been made explicit enough that employees in that 
position, whistleblowers, would have been able to rely on it without 
fear of being sued for breach of their non-disclosure obligations. And 
so, the provisions around the whistleblower immunity, which are now 
in section 1833(b),24 were crafted to provide that sort of protection. 
What’s interesting here is that this is the only preemptive provision of 
the DTSA. Preemption is not something that this Congress takes on 
lightly. I’m not even sure that anyone even noticed as the statute went 
through, but there it is. Immunity is granted under any state or federal 
trade secret law to anyone who has information under an obligation of 
confidence and wishes to disclose it to law enforcement or to a court 
in confidence or to their lawyer in confidence for that purpose—for 
that sole purpose.25 So, the immunity was established and the statute 
requires, in order to make sure that employees knew about this, that 
all nondisclosure agreements that were drafted after the date the 
 
 21. Peter S. Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection, 105 CAL. 
L. REV. 1 (2017). 
 22. James Pooley, The Myth of the Trade Secret Troll: Why the Defend Trade Secrets Act 
Improves the Protection of Commercial Information, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1045, 1076 (2016) 
(“[Menell’s] article appeared early in the process of Senate consideration of the [DTSA]. Senate 
staff reached out to Professor Menell to help craft appropriate language.”). 
 23. See Menell, supra note 21, at 31–32; see also United States ex rel. Ruhe v. Masimo Corp., 
929 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1039 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (holding publication of documents evidencing fraud 
in contravention of a nondisclosure agreement was not wrongful for public policy reasons); United 
States ex rel. Grandeau v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., 350 F. Supp. 2d 765, 773 (N.D. Ill. 2004) 
(holding that there is a “strong policy of protecting whistleblowers who report fraud against the 
government”). 
 24. 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b) (Supp. IV 2017). 
 25. Id. 
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provision came into effect, May 11 of last year, would have a notice 
of this kind of provision.26 
The second major provision, which is found in section 1836,27 on 
injunctions, bears some discussion. And that’s the provision that 
corresponds to section 2 of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.28 It is very 
familiar language that tells judges you can issue injunctions on either 
actual or threatened misappropriations. And that makes sense, of 
course. Judges need to be able to stop something wrongful happening 
before it happens, if they can. And the objection, the original language 
in the DTSA, just took what was in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and 
applied it there. There was an objection, mainly from the California 
delegation, principally Senator Feinstein, based on the concern that 
they had about the inevitable disclosure doctrine. But basically, when 
I worked with the staff on putting together language that would meet 
this objection—and with some help from Professor Lemley at 
Stanford—we suggested language that would refocus the issue away 
from this so-called inevitable disclosure doctrine and onto the question 
of what constitutes threatened misappropriation, and what public 
policy issues should inform a court’s decision on what you can do 
about an employee who has left and is going to work for a competitor, 
thereby essentially impairing the security of the information that they 
know. And all that formulation that was agreed on was that courts can 
do this. You can’t stop a person from taking a job, but you can put 
conditions on it but only if the evidence shows that they have acted in 
such a way that the conclusion can reasonably be drawn that they can’t 
be trusted. You can’t get an injunction solely based on how much that 
somebody knows. 
The third provision that I wanted to talk about tonight is 
extraterritoriality. It’s not a provision in the codified statute, but 
accompanying the statute as passed you will find very strong 
statements by Congress of their concern on the impact on U.S. 
companies and U.S. jobs from the misappropriation that happens 
 
 26. Id. § 1833(b)(3)(D). 
 27. Id. § 1836. 
 28. Compare id. § 1836(b)(3) (“In a civil action brought under this subsection with respect to 
the misappropriation of a trade secret, a court may . . . grant an injunction . . . to prevent any actual 
or threatened misappropriation described in paragraph (1) on such terms as the court deems 
reasonable . . . .”), with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIF. STATE LAWS 1985) (“Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.”). 
50.3_DTSA_SYMPOSIUM_TRANSCRIPT_V.9 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2018  6:05 PM 
340 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:331 
outside the United States.29 So there is an expression of, “We believe 
that this has an effect.” Right? And there’s also an expression found 
in a direction that the director of the Patent Office is supposed to report 
back regularly on the state of foreign-based misappropriation of U.S. 
trade secret assets.30 
So, let me quickly go through a couple of issues or details related 
to the whistleblower provision. We’ve had our first, and so far as I 
know, the only published decision—Unum Group v. Loftus31—in   
which the plaintiff had sued the departing employee and attached to 
the complaint all of the correspondence that they had had with the 
employee’s lawyer who said, “Yeah the guy did take a bunch of stuff, 
but he gave it to me so that I could make an analysis for purposes of 
this whistleblower protection, which we have. So, you can’t sue us.”32 
Well they did. They asked the court for an injunction and the 
defendant moved to dismiss.33 The court granted the injunction and 
denied the motion to dismiss.34 And the issue is, as it was presented 
by the court, yes I know this is an immunity, but the facts predicate to 
establish the immunity are not clear—have not been established yet. 
Whether or not he took this information solely for the purpose of 
reporting it as a whistleblower or had some other purpose—we haven’t 
been able to determine yet. 
Professor Menell, who had written the article that led to this 
provision being in the DTSA, quickly posted a blog that called 
Misconstruing Whistleblower Immunity Under the DTSA and pointing 
out that what Congress had done here was to establish an immunity, 
 
 29. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376, 383–84 (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (Supp. IV 2017)) (“It is the sense of Congress that—(1)trade secret 
theft occurs in the United States and around the world; (2) trade secret theft, wherever it occurs, 
harms the companies that own the trade secrets and the employees of the companies . . . .”). 
 30. Id. at 383 (requiring that the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
in conjunction with the Attorney General and IP Enforcement Coordinator, provide a report on 
global trade secret theft that describes enforcement in foreign jurisdictions, recommendations, and 
actions taken by U.S. agencies). 
 31. Unum Grp. v. Loftus, 220 F. Supp. 3d 143 (D. Mass. 2016) (treating the whistleblower 
provision as an affirmative defense); Peter S. Menell, Misconstruing Whistleblower Immunity 
Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 3, 2017), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/01/03/misconstruing-whistleblower-immunity-under-
the-defend-trade-secrets-act/ (stating that Unum Grp. is the first reported decision regarding the 
whistleblower provision). 
 32. See Unum Grp., 220 F. Supp. at 146. 
 33. Id. at 145. 
 34. Id. 
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and under Supreme Court precedent defining what an immunity is.35 
What the judge should have done here would be to protect the 
defendant from having to answer the lawsuit at all because that’s what 
immunity is. It’s not an affirmative defense.36 And so, we’re left with 
the question of how do you follow the instructions of the Supreme 
Court that says that an immunity has to be determined at the earliest 
possible time37 while dealing with an immunity like this, which unlike 
most immunities, doesn’t exist on the basis of status—who the person 
is, i.e. they’re a government employee, et cetera. It has to do with a 
fact that may or may not be true. We don’t know where this will go, 
but it will definitely be interesting. Perhaps this will get to be treated 
like personal jurisdiction, where there might be a limited amount of 
litigation allowed at the beginning with limited discovery to establish 
the predicate facts. 
Now, inevitable disclosure. Some of you probably are very 
familiar with this. The inevitable disclosure doctrine was created from 
a 1995 case where dictum was extracted to suggest that a court could 
stop somebody from taking a job because they knew too much—in 
effect.38 This was not the holding in this case, where the employee had 
lied about what he was going to do and where he was going to go after 
he left,39 and where the judge had said, “Look you really can’t be 
trusted and the information that you have is so sensitive that we’re 
going to force you not to work, at least not work in that particular job, 
 
 35. Menell, supra note 31 (stating that Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) provides the 
definition of immunity and that “Congress chose to insulate whistleblowers from exposure to trade 
secret liability through an express grant of immunity”). 
 36. See, e.g., id. (“Immunity is not a ‘mere defense’ to liability but an ‘immunity from suit’” 
(quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200).); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (“[I]mmunity 
is ‘an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.’”). 
 37. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (“[W]e repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving 
immunity questions at the earliest possible stage of litigation.”) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 
224, 227 (1991) (per curiam)). 
 38. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The ITSA, Terradyne, 
and AMP lead to the same conclusion: a plaintiff may prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation 
by demonstrating that defendant’s new employment will inevitably lead him to rely on the 
plaintiff’s trade secrets . . . The defendants are incorrect that Illinois law does not allow a court to 
enjoin the ‘inevitable’ disclosure of trade secrets.”); cf. Ryan M. Wiesner, A State-By-State Analysis 
of Inevitable Disclosure: A Need for Uniformity and a Workable Standard, 16 MARQ. INTELL. 
PROP. L. REV. 211, 214 (2012) (stating that the PepsiCo decision led to the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine gaining popularity). 
 39. PepsiCo, Inc., 54 F.3d at 1264 (stating that after receiving a written offer from Quaker and 
accepting it to be the Vice President-Field Operations for Gatorade, defendant told plaintiff he 
received an offer to be the COO of Quaker’s Gatorade and Snapple company, but had yet to take 
it). 
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for a few months until the information becomes sufficiently stale.”40 
And like I said, this comes from, or at least is based on the issue of, 
threatened misappropriation. Now, not every court was enthusiastic 
about this doctrine—that you could issue an injunction against a 
departing employee because what they knew when going to a new job 
where they would be directly competing presented itself as a threat. 
That was certainly the reaction in California, by both the 
commentators and ultimately by the first court that got this, because 
California is a place that is very solicitous of the rights of employees 
and where we value the free mobility of labor.41 In Whyte v. Schlage, 
a 2002 case, the court said basically we reject this doctrine of 
inevitable disclosure and it cannot be asserted as it was in that case as 
an alternative to proving threatened misappropriation.42 That is an 
interesting idea, that there was distinction made between the two, but 
there we are. The conclusion since then has been that California is one 
of the places where inevitable disclosure doesn’t work—it works in 
other places.43 In fact, if you actually review all of the cases, there are 
very, very few cases anywhere else in the country where courts have 
prohibited someone from taking a job without evidence of some 
improper behavior and so the doctrine really hasn’t been applied in the 
way that those who feared the whole thing thought that it was or might 
be.44 In any event, with the DTSA, what we have tried to do is come 
 
 40. Id. at 1272 (affirming the district court’s injunction enjoining defendant from taking new 
position through May 1995, in part because he “could not be trusted” with sensitive information). 
 41. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2017) (“[E]very contract by which 
anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that 
extent void.”); Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 281 (Ct. App. 2002) (“We hold 
this doctrine is contrary to California law and policy because it creates an after-the-fact covenant 
not to compete restricting employee mobility.”); Catherine H. Helm, Unholy Covenants: Not Only 
Are Most Covenants Not to Compete Unenforceable in California, They Can Also Open the 
Employer to Expensive Liability Claims, L.A. LAW., Oct. 2000, at 40, 44 (arguing that the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine, if adopted in California, could “drive a large hole through” the state’s statutory 
protection of worker mobility); John H. Matheson, Employee Beware: The Irreparable Damage of 
the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 145, 162 (1998) (arguing that if 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine was accepted in California, statutorily void non-competition 
agreements could be upheld “under the guise of protecting trade secrets”). 
 42. Whyte, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 281 (stating the court “reject[s] the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine”). 
 43. See, e.g., id. at 291 (stating that the court’s survey of other jurisdictions shows the majority 
adopting some form of the inevitable disclosure doctrine); Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Maxim 
Integrated Prods., Inc., 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 486, 504 (Ct. App. 2015) (reaffirming that the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine has been “flatly rejected” in California). 
 44. See, e.g., Padco Advisors, Inc. v. Omdahl, 179 F. Supp. 2d 600, 611 (D. Md. 2002) 
(declining to find inevitable disclosure because no tangible trade secrets were taken); 
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up with a solution to that problem that we hope will overcome the 
differences between the states who appear to have embraced the 
doctrine and those who haven’t by again directing attention back to 
the fundamental issue of “What does it take to prove threatened 
misappropriation—what is the proper balance in terms of public 
policy between the interests of the employee and the interests of the 
employer?” That balance, which is essential in trade secret law, has 
been with us since courts were first struggling with what should be 
protectable as between an employee’s skill and general knowledge on 
one hand, and the employer’s trade secrets on the other. We’re 
constantly dealing with these sorts of things, and this is one of the 
areas where we think a better focus on that balance could be made. So, 
my prediction here is that if we get cases where you have facts similar 
to PepsiCo,45 you could get a federal court in California issuing an 
injunction limiting what the departing employee could do 
notwithstanding Business & Professions Code 16600 because it does 
not violate the policy of that section.46 
Finally, extraterritoriality. We all know that laws in the U.S. are 
not to be applied externally to this country, unless congressional intent 
is very clear that they should.47 The National Espionage Act has a 
section in it that is the Act as it existed before the DTSA, Section 
1837,48 that limits extraterritoriality to an act in furtherance of the 
offense or where the offender is a U.S. citizen. So the question is: will 
Section 1837 be seen as a limitation on the broad exercise of 
jurisdiction or not? And again there is a decent argument that it should 
not be a limit. And speaking of limits, I am at the end of my time. 
CALO: Thank you very much, Jim. In a moment, we will get 
Elizabeth up here to give a critical assessment of what is going on in 
this phase. 
I wanted to clarify something. So, the idea is that there are federal 
trade secrets. There’s a federal trade secret act, there are other federal 
 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F. Supp. 2d 667, 682 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (finding no 
inevitable disclosure because the employee did not take documents or other confidential 
information); Nw. Bec-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 41 P.3d 263, 268 (Idaho 2002) (requiring a 
showing of misappropriation of trade secrets, not just a potential for future disclosure). 
 45. PepsiCo, Inc., 54 F.3d at 1264–65. 
 46. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2017). 
 47. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010) (holding that the 
“presumption against extraterritoriality” is absolute unless the text of a statute explicitly says 
otherwise). 
 48. 18 U.S.C. § 1837 (2012). 
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laws. Then there are the state laws, almost all of which peg the uniform 
trade secret law. What’s different here? So what I got out of it was the 
fact that, number one, there’s a private cause of action and that differs 
from the federal law before, correct? 
Number two, there’s the whistleblower protection, which is 
preemptive, and I want to come back to preemption in a minute when 
I get a chance to ask questions. There is this idea that you can seize 
things that was not in the federal law before. Was that in state law 
already or not in state law? 
POOLEY: Some states. 
CALO: Some states, not others. Okay, one question I did have 
was, isn’t there a specific law that goes after folks who are from 
foreign countries who try to steal trade secrets as well? That has 
extraterritoriality by definition, right? 
POOLEY: In the criminal statute, that’s Section 1831.49 
CALO: Got it. Okay, fascinating. So, I was thinking about how 
important all this is and to think about. Just recently, the head of 
Google cars who does the driverless car stuff, Chris Urmson, he gets 
paid all this money by Google. He gets paid so much money that he 
decides with one of his friends, I’m going to do my own driverless car 
start-up.50 And so he leaves Google, right?51 And he’s going to have 
his own start-up using all of the technology that they developed at 
Google. He has to be thinking really hard about these issues, and 
whether or not he makes the decision to go out on his own and maybe 
do something innovative is going to turn, in part, on these kinds of 
questions. Okay, well thank you very much again, Jim. I would like to 
invite Elizabeth up to make her remarks. 
ELIZABETH ROWE: Thank you all very much. I appreciate the 
opportunity to be here to speak with you all today about the DTSA. 
The DTSA is, as you’ve heard, is indeed a very important piece of 
legislation and the goals were quite admirable. However, as with all 
legislation arrived at by compromise, the language in certain 
provisions is not entirely clear or could be read more broadly than 
what Congress might have intended. These unintended consequences 
 
 49. Id. § 1831 (2012). 
 50. Kara Swisher & Johana Bhuiyan, Google’s Former Car Guru Chris Urmson Is Working 
on His Own Self-Driving Company, RECODE (Dec. 10, 2016, 1:07 PM), 
https://www.recode.net/2016/12/10/13905292/google-car-chris-urmson-new-company. 
 51. Id. 
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might ultimately serve to the disadvantage of the very parties that were 
meant to be protected by the Act; ultimately time will tell as the courts 
address these issues in the coming years. So today, I want to highlight 
a few of the provisions that appear to raise questions as I’ve studied 
them. 
The first is the applicability. I draw your attention to this 
language: “An owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated may 
bring a civil action under this subsection if the trade secret is related 
to a product or service used in or intended for use in interstate or 
foreign commerce.”52 It’s the particular language: “related to a product 
or service used in or intended for use in interstate commerce” that 
appears that it could be quite restricted because there are indeed trade 
secrets that will not fit into that category. Now this language is the 
same as that which was added to the EEA, the Economic Espionage 
Act, in response to the Aleynikov53 case from a few years ago, but it’s 
still ambiguous. So for instance, what about trade secrets that are for 
internal business use only, such as customer list pricing information, 
source codes, and programs? These types of trade secrets are involved 
in a large number, if not a majority, of cases that are filed in federal 
and state courts in the U.S.54 Are these types of cases then not covered 
by a strict reading under this language? There’s no question that they 
are in fact covered in the UTSA, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,55 and 
state laws based on it.56 We’ve already had one DTSA case where a 
complaint was dismissed based on this ambiguous provision and this 
 
 52. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2017). 
 53. United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2012); see United States v. Agrawal, 726 
F.3d 235 n.3 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Following Aleynikov, but prior to Agrawal’s conviction, Congress 
amended Section 1832(a) of Title 18, United States Code, to reverse our reading of the EEA.”). 
 54. David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, 
46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 72–73 (2011). 
 55. See UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT § 1 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS 1985) (“The definition includes information that had commercial value from a negative 
viewpoint, for example the results of a lengthy and expensive research which proves that a certain 
process will not work could be of great value to a competitor”); see generally 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM 
& ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, § 1.01 (2017) (identifying the development of 
the UTSA, the definition of “information,” and its enactment by the states). 
 56. See Joseph W. Hammell, PROTECTION OF EMPLOYERS’ TRADE SECRETS AND 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, Practical Law Practice Note 5-501-1473 (stating that trade secret 
protection has been recognized in a various states for marketing plans, commercial drawings, 
recipes, sales date, manufacturing processes, chemical formulae, and detailed information about 
customers); see also Beck Reed Riden LLP, Trade Secret Laws and the UTSA: 50 State and Federal 
Law Survey (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.beckreedriden.com/trade-secrets-laws-and-the-utsa-a-50-
state-and-federal-law-survey-chart/ (identifying that every state but Massachusetts and New York 
have adopted the UTSA in one form or another). 
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language: a district of Delaware case that involved allegations of 
misappropriation of some confidential recordings.57 And the court 
ruled that because the recordings were not related to a product or 
service in commerce, the count had to be dismissed.58 
But, the provision that received the most attention, as Jim 
mentioned earlier, and to which critics have voiced the most 
opposition has been the seizure provision. My own sense is that the 
provision will not be as problematic as critics feared. This is 
particularly because it says, the court may upon ex parte application, 
but only in extraordinary circumstances, issue an order providing for 
the seizure of property necessary to prevent the propagation or 
dissemination of the trade secret that is the subject of the action.59 So, 
it’s very clear that only in rare circumstances, only in extraordinary 
circumstances, should a court grant such an order. There are also 
several additional limiting provisions in the DTSA, such as the 
requirement of a showing that a Rule 65 order (such as a temporary 
restraining order or a preliminary injunction) 60 would not be sufficient 
under the circumstances and that the party might avoid, evade, or not 
comply with such an order. There is specific language saying that, 
where there is a showing that the person against whom the seizure 
would be ordered or persons acting in concert with such person would 
destroy, move, or hide, or otherwise make such matters inaccessible 
to the court, then in those types of extraordinary circumstances, a 
judge should consider issuing such an order.61 In addition, there could 
also be damages against the party who seeks the order for wrongful 
reason or where there is an excessive seizure or attempted wrongful 
seizure.62 This could also serve as a disincentive for plaintiffs who 
wish to seek such an order unnecessarily. 
Nonetheless, there is at least one part of the provision that does 
seem to raise a question for me, and it is this language: “the court may 
upon ex parte application, but only in extraordinary circumstances, 
issue an order providing for the seizure of property, necessary to 
prevent the propagation or dissemination of the trade secret that is the 
 
 57. Hydrogen Master Rights, Ltd. v. Weston, 228 F. Supp. 3d 320, 337 (D. Del. 2017). 
 58. Id. at 338. 
 59. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 2017). 
 60. Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). 
 61. Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(VII). 
 62. Id. § 1836(b)(2)(B)(vi). 
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subject of the action.”63 This word “property” could be interpreted 
very broadly. For instance, would it allow seizure of a person’s 
computer or all of a person’s computers if the alleged trade secret is in 
electronic form? And today, most trade secrets are, in fact, in 
electronic form. You could imagine the potential for a very far-
reaching and invasive sweep if a court were to read the term 
“property” broadly. 
A procedural question that I have about this provision is whether 
a state court judge can grant a seizure order. The jurisdiction language 
under the DTSA says that the district courts of the United States shall 
have original jurisdiction of civil actions brought under this section.64 
Since federal courts don’t have exclusive jurisdiction, only original 
jurisdiction to apply the DTSA, then arguably a state court judge could 
be granting, could be hearing the request and could be granting the 
seizure order if a DTSA count is filed in state court because we know 
that there are already existing provisions to file simultaneously a state 
court action and a federal court action under the DTSA under the same 
set of facts. So, assume a plaintiff were to file in state court originally, 
and file a DTSA count, and at the same time request a seizure order, 
what should happen? It would be up to the defendant to seek removal 
to the federal courts. But these ex parte seizure hearings would occur 
before the defendant even knew that there was a lawsuit, which would 
provide even more opportunity for a state court judge to rule on this 
issue. So, I wonder what scenarios might appear down the road with 
state courts ruling on seizure orders. 
Now I would like to talk a little bit about the non-competition 
agreements and the inevitable disclosure doctrine. The DTSA 
provides that a court may grant an injunction, provided that it does not 
1) prevent a person from entering an employment relationship and that 
conditions based on such employment shall be based on evidence of 
threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the 
person knows,65 or 2) otherwise conflict with an applicable state law 
prohibiting restraints on the practice of a lawful profession, trade, or 
business.66 So, this seems to me that you can’t enforce non-competes 
or otherwise enjoin an employee from working because that would 
 
 63. Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 64. Id. § 1836(c). 
 65. Id. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I). 
 66. Id. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(II). 
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“prevent the person from entering into an employment relationship.” 
Although query, what does entering into an employment relationship 
mean? Does it mean you can’t seek, accept, and start a new job? Or if 
you’ve already accepted the offer, but haven’t actually started work 
yet, does it mean you cannot report to work? Or if you’ve already been 
on the job a few days or just a few weeks? Could DTSA force a brief 
interruption that makes you sit out for a period of time, if a court were 
to grant an injunction? In other words, would an injunction that 
prevents you from continuing on the job, be in compliance with this 
language? 
With respect to the inevitable disclosure doctrine, the DTSA 
provides that court-imposed conditions of employment have to be 
based on evidence of threatened misappropriation, not just what is in 
a person’s head, what a person knows.67 This seems quite reasonable 
and could still work for some of the jurisdictions that have, in fact, 
adopted the doctrine. However, it seems to me, the nail in the coffin 
for the inevitable disclosure doctrine is actually this language: 
“prevent a person from entering,”68 because if entering is interpreted 
broadly, it strikes at the heart of the inevitable disclosure doctrine, 
which prevents a person from working for a new employer. The other 
more troubling part of this, which I imagine, was unintended, is that 
the injunction can’t conflict with state law prohibiting restraints.69 So, 
this would work well in California, and it should, because as you’ve 
heard, the California lobby fought for this language, and it reflects 
California’s public policy.70 However, what if you are in Florida, 
Texas, or the vast majority of states that do not prohibit employment 
restraints, such as non-compete agreements? Since it is impliedly okay 
to conflict with their laws not prohibiting restraints, then it seems to 
me you can’t enforce a non-compete or otherwise restrain an 
employment relationship, even in states that otherwise enforce such 
restraints, when according to the legislative history, I think the intent 
 
 67. Id. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. § 1836 (b)(3)(A)(i)(II). 
 70. See Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 944 
(2012) (“The California rule against the enforceability of non-competes is codified in section 
16600 of the Business & Professions Code, which states that ‘every contract by which anyone is 
restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent 
void.’”); 70 M. KIRBY WILCOX, CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT LAW, § 70.09 (2017) (“[C]ourts in 
California have consistently affirmed that section 16600 evinces a settled legislative policy in favor 
of employee mobility.”). 
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was probably to not conflict with the public policy of laws such as in 
California, but to respect the laws of other states that grant such 
injunctions. But perhaps I misunderstand that; I’m going to talk to Jim 
about that tonight. If this reading is accurate and a plaintiff wants to 
enforce a non-competition agreement or make an inevitable disclosure 
argument, would they need to file in state court their state trade secret 
action and does that mean they can’t file or shouldn’t file a DTSA 
count? This certainly seems to undermine the goal of access to the 
federal courts to address trade secret claims, which was one of the 
motivations behind the law. 
Another provision I would like to bring to your attention is that 
involving “improper means.” The DTSA says “improper means” does 
not include reverse engineering, independent derivation, or any other 
lawful means of acquisition.71 For the most part, the DTSA language 
on the definition of what misappropriation means mirrors that of the 
UTSA.72 However, they chose this language to make even more 
explicit what is not considered improper means: reverse engineering 
and independent derivation. Well, we already knew that, because 
under the common law and fundamental trade secret principles, trade 
secret misappropriation can’t apply to one who has reverse engineered 
or independently derived the secret.73 My issue with this is probably 
having to do with punctuation, but we’ll see. Instead of putting a 
period after the word “derivation,” they added this language: “or any 
other lawful means of acquisition.” Well, it has long been held and 
accepted that “improper means” does not have to be unlawful in order 
to constitute misappropriation.74 Otherwise legal conduct can 
nonetheless be improper if that conduct violates standards of 
commercial morality, for instance.75 So, if this new language is 
somehow excluding acquisition by any lawful means, it would be a 
 
 71. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(B) (Supp. IV 2017). 
 72. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS 1985). 
 73. 1 MILGRIM, supra note 55, § 1.01. 
 74. See Douglas W. Swartz, Mining Agreements: Contracting for Goods and Services, 5 2015 
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. SPECIAL INSTS. 1, 7 (2015) (“If a trade secret is acquired by improper 
means (a somewhat wider concept than ‘illegal means’ but inclusive of such means), the secret is 
generally deemed to have been misappropriated.”). 
 75. 64 RICHARD E. KAY, CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS § 
6 (2017); see also E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 
1970) (“A complete catalogue of improper means is not possible. In general they are means which 
fall below the generally accepted standards of commercial morality and reasonable conduct.”) 
(citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f at 10 (AM. LAW INST. 1934)). 
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tremendous departure from the current status of the law. In order to 
avoid that, I think we might want to interpret the language consistent 
with statutory interpretation principles to read “other lawful means” 
as being limited by the words that came before it, i.e., “reverse 
engineering” and “independent derivation,” but we’ll see.76 We could 
have clever defense counsel who try to argue otherwise. 
So, this is about all that I have time for, so I will stop here and I 
thank you for your attention. 
CALO: It’s just so fascinating: you have this set of political 
compromises, you have this idea of what needs to be fixed, right, and 
you have this language and the language has a life of its own and 
maybe it doesn’t do exactly what was intended. That’s a pretty 
common issue in the law. Okay, so last but certainly not least, before 
we jump into Q&A, we have some remarks from Dave Green, who 
works for a company that has a lot of intellectual property, Microsoft. 
Recently, Microsoft has made a kind of a pivot to hosting things in a 
cloud and doing data analytics and even making devices. At least, 
that’s the way they’re playing themselves these days and it seems to 
be working quite well; Microsoft’s doing great. But historically, the 
very lifeblood of this company, of course, is the ability to protect its 
secrets and its intellectual property, and not just in the United States, 
but also abroad. According to what I’ve heard from folks there, 
Microsoft gets 51% of its revenue outside of the United States.77 So 
now we’re going to hear the perspective from a person who actually 
has to live and breathe and really battle this stuff out. So with that I’d 
like to invite Dave to make some remarks. 
DAVID GREEN: Great, thanks, Ryan. I’m going to strategically 
avoid—the lectern. It’s not because I want to disadvantage myself of 
the gravitas that the lectern provides, but it’s just that when I 
disconnect my power cord, my screen goes black, and I’ve got notes 
here. 
Let’s pause for a moment and consider that, in the DTSA, 
Congress passed an intellectual property law with almost unanimous 
support of the tech industry, the manufacturing industry, and from a 
number of other industries. In contrast, other areas of intellectual 
property law, particularly copyrights and patents, cause significant 
 
 76. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(B) (Supp. IV 2017). 
 77. See Microsoft 2016 Annual Report, Note 21, MICROSOFT (Oct. 18, 2016), 
https://www.microsoft.com/investor/reports/ar16/index.html. 
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amounts of dispute, as parties have very different positions on what 
the law should be. Yet here, in the field of trade secrets, there was 
almost unilateral agreement that the law was necessary and that the 
law adopted is a good compromise. Any time Congress passes an 
intellectual property statute of the scope and breath of the DTSA, it 
should tell you something about the importance of that area of 
intellectual property. And you might ask yourself, gosh, what is the 
DTSA’s signal to all of us with respect to the status of trade secrets? 
What’s fundamentally going on with trade secrets that we needed a 
new law on the books to give us a federal civil cause of action? So I’ll 
just speak from Microsoft’s perspective, which I hope in some ways 
reflects the tech industry’s perspective, on what is going on with trade 
secrets, which as Ryan alluded, is definitely a consequence of what 
we’re seeing in businesses’ shift to the cloud. 
So, there’s really two reasons that I think trade secrets, by and 
large, are starting to rise in terms of their significance and their 
importance. And just think of this from a company’s perspective. A 
company like Microsoft depends on intellectual property in order to 
protect our innovation. We’ve got patents and we’ve got copyrights 
for our code and maybe our APIs; we’ll have to see how it turns out to 
be with respect to the Oracle v. Google case.78 And then we’ve got, 
obviously, trade secrets. There’s two things going on with the cloud. 
The first is that some interesting things happen when you try to graft 
a lot of the traditional IP protections that happen in the tech industry—
which is primarily copyrights and patents—onto cloud technology. I’ll 
explain that in a moment. The second thing is that there’s something 
fundamental about the cloud that’s causing us to treat confidential and 
proprietary information differently in terms of how we share it, 
whether we share it broadly and under the circumstances in which 
we’re sort of forced, because of the cloud’s infrastructure, to share this 
information. I’ll talk a little about that and give an example. 
But first, let me come back to some sort of high-level thoughts. 
When an owner prefers trade secrecy protection over copyright and 
patent protections, it’s usually because of two reasons. The first is that 
there’s some measurable business advantage that you obtain by 
controlling access to this innovation, rather than by releasing it in 
 
 78. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that Oracle’s 
API packages were copyrightable). 
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reliance on enforcement mechanism enabled by intellectual property 
laws, licenses, or a combination of the two. The second is it may be 
difficult to detect infringement: practically, it’s just difficult to 
discover when infringement occurs, unless it becomes publicly 
known. Let’s turn to copyright for just a moment and think about the 
shifting role that copyright protection is playing on the cloud. So 
you’ve got cloud architecture, which means no longer are you forced 
to distribute source or object code. A lot of that code can just sit behind 
a server, and what the consumer has access to is the functionality of 
the code or the service provided by the code, not the raw bits. So the 
code stays in the cloud, and that fact necessarily decreases your 
reliance on enforcement triggered by reproduction and distribution 
rights. One practical consequence is that your competitors are much 
less likely to reverse engineer our processes because they don’t have 
access to the code; they can’t decompile, they can’t run their various 
sniffers and analytic tools to determine what’s going on or what the 
secret sauce is. When you remove reproduction and distribution of 
code in which copyright plays a vital role, that lessens the role that 
copyright plays on the value chain. 
So now let’s switch over to patents. There’s some fundamental 
things going on with patents in this day and age that are causing some 
stress as well. If you’ve taken in your Patent Law courses or you just 
follow the news, obviously, you understand that software patents and 
business method patents generally are under pressure, if not under 
attack. We have some decisions like Alice79 that are narrowing patent 
subject matter eligibility. And as a consequence, when you’re drafting 
a patent, in order to overcome possible attacks on eligibility, you will 
tend to disclose more information; you’ve got to specify and articulate 
different methods and systems, which invariably causes you to reveal 
more about the specific process that protects your innovation. Whereas 
before, you had more of a generic application and you could keep from 
disclosure your own specific implementations by generalizing the 
scope of the patent. So that’s an interesting complication. And if you 
have disclosed an innovative process in a patent, the cloud makes it 
more difficult to detect infringement of that patent. That’s because the 
means, methods, and systems of operation used by your competitors 
 
 79. See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (holding that 
software implementation of an escrow arrangement was not patentable on the grounds that generic 
computer implementation fails to transform an abstract idea into an invention). 
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are also in a cloud and you just don’t have the visibility into the inner 
mechanisms and process. You see the outputs and functions, but you 
are guessing at what systems and methods of operation produced those 
outcomes. In a system where you have to disclose more to obtain a 
patent, and the detectability of infringement is more difficult in the 
cloud, you’ve got a mismatch between the protection realistically 
available in the cloud and that provided via traditional IP such as 
patent and copyright regimes. 
Now let’s turn to the second reason, a tension with our traditional 
dichotomy for understanding trade secrets. The dichotomy is: the 
value of disclosure versus this value of secrecy. And people tend to 
think of that as a binary choice, right? You either disclose and lose, or 
you withhold and maintain that value. I think what we are finding in a 
cloud is actually more complicated. We are starting to see hybrid 
models — I’ll give one particular example. The challenge of reliance 
on a binary model where you don’t disclose and you put in the 
reasonable measures to control access is that those measures introduce 
friction. And that friction introduces inefficiency in the marketplace 
in terms of how people access and utilize your material. If you really 
want to maximize the value of your proprietary information, 
particularly in a cloud environment, you may have to disclose that 
information in a much broader way than would be typical if you were 
a biotech company with a secret biotech formula for a drug, or if you 
are a manufacturer with a particular processor method of manufacture 
that you want to keep proprietary. So I’m going to use an example that 
shows attention to this dichotomy. 
Apple has this terrific application called Siri, its personal digital 
assistant. There may be aspects of Siri that are patentable, but a lot of 
the proprietary innovation around Siri has been kept behind closed 
doors: how it works, the algorithms, the information that helps Siri 
understand how to execute a user’s tasks, etc. That approach provided 
Apple with an initial period of exclusivity, a competitive benefit for 
this great exclusive feature. They were first to market with it, and it 
produced some renown. And then very soon you saw competitors 
come into the field with their own innovations. But they did not just 
come in with their own competing innovations; they came in with their 
own competing business models. Siri came to market in 2011 and its 
main features were things like: searching the Internet, getting 
directions, calling or texting somebody in an automated fashion. Now 
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compare that to its competitor, Amazon’s Echo. First of all, Amazon 
came out of nowhere: the AI processes for the Echo just sort of popped 
almost out of thin air. You have this device and all of a sudden, within 
about 12–18 months . . . —who here bought one for Christmas?—they 
are just everywhere. And the functionality that Amazon’s Echo 
enabled was far broader than Siri for a very important reason; Amazon 
had a strategy of releasing an SDK80 that actually revealed far more 
information about the processes and systems of its AI and allowed 
people to develop independent applications that did things like 
ordering tulips on 1-800 flowers, calling an Uber, checking your 
balance on Capital One, or playing NPR—things that couldn’t have 
been done as efficiently or brought as quickly to market in a closed 
environment and closed model. So you’ve got this interesting new 
hybrid model where you release more information than you typically 
would. You can do so if you utilize the cloud. A lot of the really 
sensitive information you can keep in the cloud behind closed doors. 
You can parse out the functions and provide via an SDK, perhaps one 
with confidentiality provisions and reliance on trade secret protection, 
some measures that allow a broader disclosure than you typically 
would and then the information that sort of has less relevance as a 
trade secret may not have any protections under copyright or patent 
gets just broadly distributed. So the cloud is doing something 
fundamental in our industry to elevate the role of trade secrets. 
The one thing I will leave you with—because most of you are law 
students and many of you are practitioners—is that you’ve got to 
encourage a broad perspective of trade secrets, you need to parse 
through the DTSA to understand the civil causes of action and the 
requirements to enjoy the enhanced remedies or the seizure 
opportunities and you have to bring that information back into your 
company to fully advantage yourself of the DTSA’s opportunities. 
One of the neat things about the DTSA is that the DTSA has rekindled 
this discussion of trade secrets. It is really helpful to companies like 
Microsoft. I will just ask a broad question and I won’t ask you to 
answer it, maybe just answer it to yourself. If our competitors could 
know five things about Microsoft, if they had access to five critical 
things, what would those five things be? What are the most important 
 
 80. A software development kit (SDK) consists of software development tools to create apps 
for a specific platform. Grant Glas, What Is an API and SDK?, APP PRESS, (Apr. 22, 2015), 
https://www.app-press.com/blog/what-is-an-api-and-sdk. 
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five or ten things at Microsoft that really constitute proprietary 
confidential trade secrets? Now, notice I called them confidential trade 
secrets. And I did that because I think one of the mistakes companies 
tend to make today is that they put a broad blanket over all 
information, calling it confidential. They rely on NDAs, they mark 
things confidential, etc. But there is a difference between what is 
confidential and what constitutes a trade secret. And if your employees 
don’t know the difference between the two, if your company cannot 
make the distinction between the confidential information and the 
components of that confidential information that comprise critical 
trade secrets, how on earth are you going to impose the type of 
reasonable measures and reasonable access controls and other 
compliance practices in order to take advantage of the DTSA seizure 
provision81 (which requires what I think is an enhanced pleading 
burden)? And how are you going to create a culture around trade 
secrets that is different than creating a culture around confidentiality? 
So one of the neat things that the DTSA has done is that it has 
caused a lot of companies to look at how to comply with these 
additional requirements under the DTSA and that prompts a really 
candid conversation about the role that trade secrets play, and how to 
maximize trade secrets in terms of protecting their innovation. It’s a 
fun question to be able to go to business executives and ask them 
what’s really important. They will say everything is important: 
marketing, our products, and the make up of our next version of 
Surface,82 the technical spec, the marketing timelines, how much we 
are committing, etc. When that happens, I say, “Stop! What are the 
five or ten things that if other companies knew or had access to would 
cause us significant competitive harm?” And the practices around 
those, the compliance efforts and practices around those, should 
necessarily be heightened. The consequence of heightening those 
protective measures is that then you are allowed to look at the other 
confidential information, not from a compliance perspective—which 
is how do I protect it, how do I make sure I advantage myself under 
trade secrets law—but to look at what’s the friction that we introduce 
by controlling the access and use of this material. 
 
 81. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b) (2) (Supp. IV 2017). 
 82. Microsoft Surface “is a versatile laptop, powerful tablet, and portable studio in one.” Buy 
Microsoft Surface Version 2, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/surface/devices/surface-book-2/overview (last visited Nov. 10, 2017). 
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One company—I won’t name one of our competitors, well not 
really competitor but more of a partner—did this exercise and what 
they found was that, because of credential restrictions and all the other 
access protocols that they had around source code, their coders, 
instead of going into the company’s warehouse and utilizing code that 
had been vetted and tested, actually started rewriting code again, or 
went to maybe less protective or less critical open source code. So by 
removing the friction that was caused by some of these access 
protocols, for some component of their code they ended up creating 
efficiency in how they and others are able to repurpose this code. Not 
all of our source code is of equal importance; not every bit is as 
important as the other bits—there are probably kernels that are really 
critical, but there is also code that is important but less sensitive and 
does not need the same access restrictions. If we reduce those access 
restrictions, without losing the benefit of confidentiality and hopefully 
without negating our trade secret protection, we have now taken away 
friction and we have introduced a level of efficiency. And just as Echo 
and Amazon did, if you take that practice and expand the scale, all of 
a sudden you are rethinking the “pallet” of your intellectual property 
protections, i.e. when you use trade secrets, when you use copyright, 
when you use patents, and when you use none of them. 
CALO: I think Dave’s contribution we are going to need a 
glossary. So SDK is a Software Developer Kit, that is what you give 
to people that you want to develop on your system. API is a 
Programmable Interface, what is the A for again? I forget. 
GREEN: Application. 
CALO: Application Program Interface. Thank you. I love it. I just 
love talking to technologists, or in this case, technologically savvy 
lawyers, about what they do. In the interest of tim—because I do want 
to be able to have time to have a little dialogue—I am just going to 
offer a couple of provocations and get you all to respond to them or 
whatever interests you. The first is that my intuition is, as a person 
who studies emerging technology and law, that this notion of 
preemption is going to be a big deal. And let me tell you why. So right 
now, there are all these different states that have these security breach 
notification laws. And what such a law does is that it says that if you 
are in a particular state and you have a security breach, and all this 
data gets out about your consumers—big companies hate it. They hate 
it because they don’t know, from state to state, what the laws are. And 
50.3_DTSA_SYMPOSIUM_TRANSCRIPT_V.9 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2018  6:05 PM 
2017] THE FEDERALIZATION OF TRADE SECRECY 357 
they differ from each other. Who do you have to notify, how fast you 
have to do it, right? So big companies, including Microsoft, Google, 
and everybody, have been pushing for a unitary standard, a federal law 
about data breach notification. They are saying yes, yes, regulate us in 
that way. Tell us what we need to do in the event of a breach. But let 
me tell you, such a federal law is definitely going to have preemptive 
effects against state laws when it comes down the line. It will have 
preemption because it is good for those powerful companies who are 
asking for it. So here, with DTSA, we have a situation where there is 
no preemption. You could say there is a patchwork, and actually there 
are multiple layers that a company can avail itself of if there is a trade 
secret problem. And yet, there is this one particular place—concerning 
whistle blowing—where DTSA is preemptive.83 In other words, 
maybe there was an intuition that states should have whistle blower 
protection and they don’t. And that ends up being pro-employee. So I 
guess one thing I want to throw out is, is it weird that there is not 
preemption? Were there players in the system, in the ecosystem here, 
that were pushing for preemption and lost out? 
The second thing I wanted to flag was basically, and I just want 
to remind Elizabeth, and I am sure she remembers this, she had this 
question for Jim about whether or not seizures apply in state court and 
whether you could go to a state court and ask them to seize something. 
And I find that fascinating and I hope Jim could give us his thoughts 
about that. 
The last provocation is around this idea of what it means to do 
more than just know something. So remember my example about 
Chris Urmson, and he is leaving Google and he is going to go start his 
own driverless car.84 I mean all that guy was doing for a living was 
doing driverless cars for Google. He comes out of Stanford. He is a 
brilliant guy. Does all of this driverless car work. Obviously, he knows 
a lot. He and Sebastian Thrun made driverless cars for Google.85 He 
 
 83. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1833 (Supp. IV 2017) (providing immunity to those who confidentially 
disclose trade secrets to the government); see Daniel Hurson, The Whistleblower Protections Of 
The Defend Trade Secrets Act Could Have A Broad Impact—But Only if Employees are Told About 
Them, MONDAQ (Sep. 13, 2016), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/526468/Whistleblowing/The+Whistleblower+Protections
+Of+The+Defend+Trade+Secrets+Act+Could+Have+A+Broad+ImpactBut+Only+If+Employees
+Are+Told+About+Them. 
 84. Swisher & Bhuiyan, supra note 50. 
 85. Chunka Mui, Chris Urmson Reflects on Challenges, No-Win Scenarios and Timing of 
Driverless Cars, FORBES (May 8, 2017, 12:45 PM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
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is going to walk away with that knowledge. And whatever he does 
next, even if he does not take proprietary code, he knows what he 
knows. And his experiences at Google are going to inform what he 
does. And then he does a competitive start-up.86 Is that enough in 
terms of its behavior to have a trade secrecy problem? So I am just so 
curious as to what folks think about what goes into that notion of 
knowledge plus. Aren’t we all informed all the time by our 
experiences and isn’t there no way around that? Anyway, those are 
three provocations I would like to toss around for each of you to 
respond to as you wish and then I would like to open it up to questions. 
POOLEY: I think it’s one of the conceits of trade secret law that 
judges can distinguish between that kind of information that 
somebody ought to be able to put into in their tool kit and take with 
them because it represents developed “skill,” and on the other hand, 
the specific information relevant to, that belongs to, the former 
employer. And actually, in most cases, it is not that hard, but you can 
imagine ones like the one that you’re talking about, where somebody 
was engaged at such a high level that it is hard—it is very, very hard 
to draw that line. But that’s why judges get paid so much. 
CALO: For example, someone goes to Chris, and says, “Hey we 
should do this thing where we, you know, we can use the STK and the 
API—we should do that,” and then he’s gonna be like, “Nope, that 
doesn’t work. We tried that at Google and it doesn’t work.” I mean, is 
that potentially protected? 
POOLEY: Potentially, you would have to have more context than 
that. 
CALO: Anyone else have any other responses? 
GREEN: So did anyone follow the Oculus Rift87 case? The Oculus 
Rift case is a fascinating case; fascinating just for a human drama 
associated with it. The claims are a little bit difficult to parse: there’s 
a copyright claim, a trade secret theft claim, a breach of confidentiality 
 
sites/chunkamui/2017/05/08/urmson-on-driverless-cars/#26b3b9a747c9; Tom Simonite, The 
Creator of Google’s Self-Driving Car Now Competes with It, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 26, 2016), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602712/the-creator-of-googles-self-driving-car-now-
competes-with-it. 
 86. Danielle Muoio, Tesla’s Former Autopilot Head Is Launching a Self-Driving-Car 
Company—and It Could Have a Big Advantage, BUS. INSIDER (May 29, 2017, 10:37 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/aurora-innovation-self-driving-car-company-rival-tesla-google-
2017-5. 
 87. Zenimax Media, Inc. v. Oculus VR, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 3d 697 (N.D. Tex. 2015). 
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claim.88 Oddly enough there’s a half a billion-dollar verdict, I think.89 
$500 million dollars including personal liability imposed on some of 
the founders, but the jury found no trade secret theft.90 They found 
breach of confidentiality, and they found some copyright infringement 
based upon some sloppy practices.91  
My sense is that the challenge with the example you posed is 
having someone who is a guru in that area and they start to move 
around; I think tech companies view laws in these situations as both a 
sword and a shield: if you insist on strong provisions, if you love the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine, you’re never going to have any 
movement, right? That is bad because I think the lifeblood of tech 
companies is the free flow of workers and information. The second is, 
it is not like trade secret information exists in a vacuum. Typically if 
a company has had a guru there, it also has a team of lawyers, 
scribbling very furiously, writing down patent applications and 
copyrighting different implementations of code; so if that person goes 
to a different company, it is not like suddenly there is no IP to protect 
the company’s innovation. But it is a challenge and we’ve had 
scenarios where one of our engineers left to go to Google under 
challenging circumstances, let’s put it that way. So these things can be 
difficult to parse, but every time a company is in the position of 
worrying about one of its best and brightest leaving, another section 
of the same company is worried about the arrival of such a person, 
what that person brings with them, and hopefully what they do not 
bring with them because that taints that company’s development and 
responsible companies develop good practices on these issues. They 
have entrance and exit interviews with their employees so that it is 
very clear that when an employee departs, they have a really good 
 
 88. See id. at 703–05; Lucas Matney, Jury Awards ZeniMax $500 Million in Oculus VR 
Lawsuit, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 1, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/ 2017/02/01/jury-awards-zenimax-
500-million-in-oculus-vr-lawsuit. 
 89. Matney, supra note 88. 
 90. Ben Gilbert, Facebook Just Lost a $500 Million Lawsuit—Here’s What’s Going On, BUS. 
INSIDER (February 7, 2017, 9:05 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-zenimax-oculus-
vr-lawsuit-explained-2017-2/#august-2013-oculus-vr-a-startup-working-on-a-virtual-reality-
headset-called-the-rift-hires-doom-creator-john-carmack-of-id-software-as-its-chief-technology-
officer-1. 
 91. See ZeniMax, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 705 (“According to Plaintiff, Defendant acquired Oculus 
for a substantial amount of money despite knowing about the copyright infringement allegations. 
As the owner of Oculus, Defendant []allegedly financed and supported Oculus’s conduct of 
developing software based on Plaintiffs’ copyrighted information. These allegations are sufficient 
to at least plead a plausible claim of vicarious copyright infringement. . . .”). 
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sense of what the company cares about, what they are concerned 
about, and how to ensure that there is not a leakage of proprietary 
information as opposed to someone just taking the body of knowledge 
that they developed over the course of their career and jumping ship. 
ROWE: I think too, that one of the tricky things about trade secret 
law which makes it so complicated is that, in theory, we can talk about 
all that it covers and specialized knowledge versus generalized 
knowledge and all of that,92 but this is one of those areas of law where 
a lot happens after the fact: while the lawyers are figuring out what 
they’re going to say in the complaint because the client is upset and 
the lawyers are working backwards from those particular 
circumstances. For every one trade secret case where you say, “Oh this 
seems like a perfectly legitimate claim,” for example, where the 
treasurer of the company was just about to walk out the door with this 
person, you can find several other cases where you think, “Well, I 
don’t know, this is kind of a stretch, I’m not quite sure it’s even a trade 
secret case to begin with.” But the lawyers are tasked with crafting a 
trade secret claim and they want an injunction, and that is why when 
you look at the jurisprudence, you have such a wide range of cases. Of 
course, trade secret law is highly factual but much of the variation 
comes from the fact that the law has evolved as state law. Every state 
is different, and the trade secrecy law is based upon and supported by 
the public policy of the relevant states. So again, taking California, 
one of the leaders and I think, probably the most sophisticated states 
in terms of handling trade secret cases: when you look at the body of 
law coming out of California, versus the body of law coming out of 
Texas or Florida or even New York, California law looks quite 
different. This was, again, part of the reason for wanting greater 
harmonization with the federal law, particularly, for companies that 
do business in more than one state, and across the world. So we’ll see 
how that continues, how it evolves. 
CALO: So why not preemption? 
POOLEY: You can’t get it. Congress won’t take it. It’s a non-
starter. 
 
 92. See generally, e.g., In re Innovative Constr. Sys., Inc., 793 F.2d 875, 879 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(noting how the doctrine of trade secrets involves balancing competing interests of employers in 
wanting to protect specialized knowledge, with that of former employees seeking general use of 
skills); B.C. Ziegler & Co. v. Ehren, 414 N.W.2d 48, 53 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (noting the same 
balance of interests). 
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CALO: But why is it so successful with other stuff? For example, 
Food and Drug Administration rules. You know what I mean, it 
happens. 
POOLEY: I wish I knew, but this is one of the secrets of the 
political process. In this field, maybe we could just conclude that there 
was not enough of a sense that we needed to replace state laws as 
opposed to layer on top of them; there was not a compelling enough 
need to get over the resistance to preemption. They just don’t like it. 
Preemption is the federal government telling the states what to do. 
GREEN: You see that with rights of publicity too. If you ever 
follow the development and the legislative efforts around rights of 
publicity, they’re going nowhere and it is primarily because they just 
can’t agree on a uniform standard that will overcome some of the 
concerns. It’d be interesting to see if we can ever have a national right 
of publicity or even a federal right of publicity that doesn’t preempt 
state rights. 
CALO: Fascinating. Okay, questions from our audience? 
AUDIENCE: For the ex parte seizure provisions, I want each of 
you to describe the nightmare scenario, what possibly could go 
wrong? To anticipate this for district court judges, what should they 
watch out for, and Dave, particularly for you, if you could characterize 
a heightened pleading standard. What should it be? What suggestions 
should we give the courts? 
POOLEY: We should probably involve the Federal Judicial 
Center in this conversation because they have been tasked by the 
Congress with coming up with a set of best practices for handling these 
sorts of things, but I’ll answer your question. In the terms that were 
described to me by several federal judges, their nightmare scenario is 
that the property that has to be seized is bigger than a bread box—a lot 
bigger than a bread box—and is complicated, and sensitive, and they 
have to find a place to put it because the statute requires that the 
property be held by the court.93 They’re worried about that. They can 
handle paper, but they don’t know what might be coming. 
ROWE: I think one nightmare provision aside from that has to do 
with consequences. So, assume you have an innocent victim—
assuming that status still exists somewhere—and again, if the word 
“property” is interpreted very broadly, that they say the person has left 
 
 93. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(D)(i) (Supp. IV 2016). 
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a former employer and has started a competing operation, so the 
authorities come in and they seize everything that is necessary for the 
start-up—all the computers, all the information behind the new 
operation—take it away to be stored. Well in the meantime, what 
happens? I’ve seen this happen in state court on a smaller scale where 
companies actually have to go out of business or they suffer significant 
financial losses during a period of time when the business simply can’t 
operate because they have been deprived of information. And I think 
there was a time too—seizure provisions remind me of a time—I don’t 
know if any of you are familiar with the Church of Scientology cases 
out of California during the late 1990s, where the church moved for 
preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders against 
former church members who had allegedly taken trade secrets.94 The 
California courts—many of them—granted seizure orders95 and so 
people entered and removed computers and everything else. And 
ultimately, most of those orders ended up being reversed,96 but in the 
interim, those people were deprived of their property. So I think we 
could think of those kinds of situations. I think that was what was 
driving those who were opposed to the seizure provision from the 
beginning, thinking about the innocent victims that might get caught 
up in this remedy. 
CALO: Maybe you two could connect about the audience 
question about what would be necessary regarding higher pleadings, 
and maybe we could take one more question. 
AUDIENCE: Hi, I’m a practicing attorney, and one of the areas 
that wasn’t discussed tonight was about contract drafting. There’s 
been a bit of confusion about what language to use in a contract where 
you’re hiring an independent contractor to write a screenplay or to give 
a record deal versus an actual employee let’s say, who actually works 
at your company on a day-to-day basis. Can you talk a little about that? 
 
 94. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 
1238 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (granting in part and denying in part plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1077–79 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(reviewing the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction). 
 95. See, e.g., Netcom, 923 F. Supp. at 1240. 
 96. See, e.g., Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1091 (reversing the district court’s grant of a 
preliminary injunction); see also Netcom, 923 F. Supp. at 1265 (vacating plaintiff’s ex parte writ 
of seizure and ordering return of all articles seized). 
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GREEN: So we went through that tack ourselves, which is—how 
can you write in plain English as opposed to the verbosity I guess, the 
language in the code? What’s the right magic words to use? 
AUDIENCE: And would you have to? 
GREEN: So, you don’t have to do anything, right, but you simply 
don’t avail yourselves of the benefits that are afforded under the 
DTSA. You still have a state secret cause of action, or you may just 
be limited in terms of the remedies that you can seek. The challenge 
is that when you want to comply and you try to introduce compliance, 
you’ll find two things: you’ll find that fitting that kind of language into 
the agreement is messy. It was obviously not written by people who 
draft contracts with artists and entertainers. It raises a lot of questions. 
AUDIENCE: Right, it seems to come right out of left field when 
you put it in there. It’s like, “What is this about?” 
GREEN: Yeah, and I often see that in settlement agreements. 
Right, so you’ve got settlement agreements for release of claims. 
You’ve got this language that is unique to California,97 for example, 
that sort of pops in there. Look, you don’t have to put it in there. I think 
there are ways in which to parse the language—frankly, just go online 
and type in the typical query and you’ll see different efforts by law 
firms to try to articulate what a good standard is. I don’t necessarily 
worry so much about that because what most tech companies have 
done, at least those that I’ve talked to, is that they actually put their 
verbatim text, but they just don’t put it in the contract. They put a link 
in the contract to a policy around confidentiality, or they place it in 
their NDA, where everything in the NDA looks scary and a little bit 
confusing and so, that’s how they get around the practical 
complications of that language. 
POOLEY: One way that a very large client of mine has decided 
to take care of this, and I think it works fine, is just to say very briefly, 
the obligations of confidentiality don’t apply to any information about 
wrongdoing that you want to report to the authorities or to a court in 
confidence in order to use the phrase of the statute that creates the 
immunity, but it’s a single sentence. And what you’ve done is give 
them notice that all this doesn’t apply, therefore, they have immunity. 
 
 97. Bradford P. Anderson, Please Release Me, Let Me Go! Releases of Unknown Claims in 
the Penumbra of California Civil Code Section 1542, 9 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 1, 2 (2008) (“In any 
general release with a California nexus, you will likely see a waiver of rights under California Civil 
Code Section 1542, thereby releasing unknown claims.”). 
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GREEN: Ryan, by the way, I’d like to answer Justin’s question 
very quickly, where you asked about our nightmare scenario. My 
nightmare scenario is a judge that has, on the one side, an overly 
sympathetic plaintiff who doesn’t understand technology with some 
loose pleadings in terms of the specificity of what their trade secrets 
are and the facts suggesting how the secrets were misappropriated. On 
the other side, there is an unsympathetic defendant, and then in the 
middle, you’ve got a cloud services provider who has lots of 
information, spread across multiple servers, possibly in multiple 
jurisdictions, and doesn’t have an opportunity to educate the court on 
what seizure in the cloud actually looks like. That’s probably the 
nightmare scenario for a company like Microsoft. 
CALO: Me too. When I wake up in the middle of the night, that’s 
usually the first thing I think of: the cloud and what it’s going to do. 
Well, the sign of a great panel is that there are many more things to be 
asked and said. Please join me in thanking this wonderful panel. 
 
